Anatomy Of NATO Attack On Pakistan
Pakistan Observer
January 31, 2012
Review of NATO attack
Asif Haroon Raja*
Edited by RR
It will be recalled that in order to multiply pressure on Pakistan, the western border was deliberately heated up by Pakistan’s strategic partners sitting in Kabul.
Between May and September 2011, tens of deadly raids had been conducted by Waliur Rehman- and Maulvi Faqir-led militants based in the safe haven of Kunar and by Fazlullah-led militants based in Nuristan duly backed by the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), RAAM, the Afghan regime and NATO. Levies employed on border duties and villagers were cruelly killed by militants. Kabul and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] HQ were repeatedly requested to control cross-border terrorism and to close down the sanctuaries of anti-Pakistan militants in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, but no heed was paid. Perforce, General Headquarters deployed regular troops in Mehmand [Mohmand] and Chitral and cleared the restive areas of the presence of undesirables. The 7 AK Regiment was deployed in the Mehmand Agency closer to the Afghan border. It established several border posts to keep a watch over possible infiltration routes.
Two posts, Volcano and Boulder, were set up ahead of a village in the Mohmand Agency on a barren ridgeline about 8,000 feet in height in a manner that they leaned forward on the forward slope so as to effectively cover the valley running from east to west. The two posts, each comprising about a platoon strength of 34 soldiers, were so deployed as to cover the northwestern and northeastern approaches. Weapons were sighted in a manner as to be able of bringing down an enfilade and spraying fire in the valley. One post covered the exit point of the valley in the west; the second post covered the eastern edge at the entry point. Company HQ with a platoon was in depth. The posts located on a dominating salient enjoyed excellent line of sight and arc of fire. The two posts also acted as the screen for the battalion.
The valley was frequented by TTP [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan] militants together with Afghan National Army-trained Afghan militants based in Kunar. This route was the shortest and safest from Kunar and led straight to heart of the Mehmand Agency wherefrom the infiltrators had multiple choices to either strike within that tribal agency, or Bajaur, or Upper or Lower Dir. Deeper targets in Malakand, Buner, Swat or even Chitral and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could also be reached via Mehmand.
As a consequence of the deployment of the two posts, several attempts by militants to sneak through the valley were successfully blocked. As a result, cross-border movement had ceased from mid-October onwards. Blockage of the main passageway resulted in the assembling of large numbers of militants belonging to the TTP in Kunar who were getting desperate to enter Pakistan. The Karzai regime, NDS [National Directorate of Security] and Afghan National Army (ANA) were also boiling with anger after attacks on NDS HQ and murder of Prof Rabbani in Kabul and wanted to settle scores.
In order to seek assistance from NATO, NDS and RAW [India's Research and Analysis Wing] passed false information to the CIA that Pakistan-sponsored militants were using the Salala-Kunar route to create unrest in Kunar and other regions of Eastern Afghanistan. It was also conveyed that the two Pakistani posts at Salala were not only providing cover to the infiltrators but also preventing the movement of their fighters into Mehmand. Based on this input, a comprehensive plan was hatched in Kabul to provide covering fire to the batch of over 100 militants and ensure their safe entry. It was also planned to destroy the two posts so as to remove the irritants for good.
As a cover-up, plan, a mockup operation by the ANA was conducted in Kunar province from 25 November onwards. NATO air cover was made part of the operation. The area was well away from the Salala area and deep inside Afghan territory and the Pakistan Army was informed about it in advance. Just before dawn on the night of 25/26th, when all the soldiers were fast asleep except for the sentries on duty, two Apache helicopters suddenly crossed the border and started firing at the two posts indiscriminately. The helicopters remained at a safe distance for fear of being hit by an ack-ack gun or a surface-to-air missile. The helicopters were backed by four other combat helicopters and close air support was provided by F-18s. No sooner had fire came on the posts than a field officer commanding the two posts instantly contacted the ISAF and informed it that Pakistani posts were being attacked and that the fire must cease. But firing continued for one hour.
During this period, the bulk of the infiltrating force along with donkeys laden with ammunition and explosives moved past the valley. By that time, urgent messages had been sent by GHQ on a hotline and the helicopters turned back. When the helicopters went away and the dust settled down, the defenders detected movement in the valley. The stragglers had still not gone past the valley and as such were brought under coordinated fire. On receipt of a distress signal from the militants, the helicopters returned and plastered the two posts with ATGMs [anti-tank guided missiles] with a vengeance for the next thirty minutes. 24 soldiers including one major and one subaltern died and 16 soldiers received serious injuries.
In order to obfuscate the facts NATO has taken urged a plea as an afterthought that the helicopters responded to hostile fire coming from the posts. There was no reason for the defenders to open fire at the helicopters without any provocation. If one agrees with NATO’s preposterous contention for argument sake, the fast-moving and highly maneuverable helicopters with anti-armor and anti-aircraft protection could have easily moved away out of range of the weapons deployed on the ground.
If it was unintentional, as claimed by NATO leadership, why couldn’t the helicopters equipped with night-fighting capability see a Pakistani flag fluttering on top of a post and soldiers dressed in uniforms, particularly when each flying helicopter/jet/cargo plane carries marked maps showing the border and border posts? If the helicopters came in response to the call made by the ANA, how come the attackers attacked the static posts atop a ridgeline? In these ten years NATO should have learnt that Taliban never take up static defences and that too on hilltops. They prefer caves and valleys. If the helicopters made a mistake once, why was the mistake repeated? If the map reference of Salala posts was marked wrongly by the Border Coordination Centre, or passed on wrongly by a NATO liaison officer, why did the massacre continue for ninety minutes after NATO HQ was frantically informed on a hotline at multiple levels including GHQ to get the fire stopped forthwith?
Since the real purpose was to give covering fire to the infiltrators, heads of the troops manning the posts were pinned down to facilitate the unobserved and unhindered movement of infiltrators carrying their extra baggage on donkeys. It would be a sheer underestimation of NATO power to take nearly two hours to destroy posts made of cement blocks and strengthened by sandbags. It was a willful massacre and it didn’t end on 26 November. The terrorists that managed to sneak in on that night are now busy carrying out terrorist attacks in Kyhber Pakhtunkwa, Khyber Agency and other nearby areas.
The inquest carried out by ISAF’s Brig Stephen Clark apportions equal blame on both sides and wrongfully maintains that the fire was in self-defence. The US accepts several omissions made by the attackers but terms all of them coincidental and affixes partial responsibility on Pakistan. It is inconceivable that the ISAF, with the best technology, was unaware of the existence of two posts. US officials consistently stated that the attack was unintentional before and during the course of inquiry, thereby influencing the investigating team. The US wants the Pakistan Army to accept this factually incorrect report based on half-truths. Mercifully, the Army and the government are on one page. Not only has the report has been rejected, the government has taken bold and appropriate steps to checkmate America’s bellicosity and aggressive unilateralism.
*The writer is a retired Brig [brigadier commander] and a defence analyst.









